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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2A-3(2)(k), as amended. Jurisdiction in the 
Supreme Court prior to transfer was proper under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2-2(3)(j), as amended. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Whether the trial court correctly granted summary judgment 
by ruling that as a matter of law the racing application form 
signed by the St. George Lions Club did not provide a ground for 
the American Quarter Horse Association's indemnity claim against 
the International Association of Lions Clubs for injury to jockey 
Peter Chavez. 
Summary judgment should be granted if the pleadings, 
depositions, affidavits, and admissions show that there is no 
genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), U.R.C.P.; Webster v. 
Sill. 675 P.2d 1170 (Utah 1983). The district court's conclusion 
of law is reviewed for correctness by this Court, State v. Rio 
Vista Oil, Ltd., 786 P.2d 1343 (Utah 1990). 
The appellate court may affirm a grant of summary judgment 
on any ground available to the trial court, even if it is one not 
relied on by the trial court. Higgins v. Salt Lake Co., 855 P.2d 
231, 235 (Utah 1993) . 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES. 
RULES AND REGULATIONS 
There are none whose interpretation is determinative of the 
issues raised in this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings 
Plaintiffs are the parents of Gilbert Chavez, a horse jockey 
who was seriously injured in a horse racing accident at the Dixie 
Downs track meet at St. George, Utah, on April 21, 1989. 
Plaintiffs' first amended complaint asserts negligence 
claims against (1) American Quarter Horse Association ("AQHA"), 
which allegedly sanctioned and controlled the race; (2) 
Washington County, which allegedly owned and maintained the 
racetrack; and (3) St. George Association of Lions Clubs, which 
allegedly installed and maintained the racetrack and equipment. 
Each defendant has denied negligence and liability and has raised 
affirmative defenses. These claims remain pending in the 
district court, and are set for jury trial beginning January 30, 
1995. 
AQHA also filed a third party complaint seeking contractual 
indemnity for AQHA's own negligence against an additional party 
not named as a defendant in plaintiffs' first amended complaint, 
the International Association of Lions Clubs ("the International 
Association"). This indemnity claim was based on a written 
"Application for Recognition of Grading Races" dated July 13, 
1988, over nine months before the accident, and signed by: 
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"St. George Lions Club Joe Bowcutt - track manager." The 
application states that the St. George Lions Club agrees to 
indemnify AQHA from any liability arising from unsafe track 
conditions. However, the International Association is not a 
party and does not appear anywhere on the written application. 
However, AQHA alleged that the St. George Club was a subsidiary 
of the International Association, and therefore the International 
Association should be liable to AQHA. 
Following discovery, the International Association moved for 
summary judgment in its favor dismissing this third party 
complaint. The International Association pointed out to the 
trial court that AQHA's third party complaint did not assert that 
the International Association committed a tort or did anything 
wrong. AQHA simply asserted that the St. George Lions Club was a 
subsidiary of the International Association and thus the 
International Association should be vicariously or derivatively 
liable for any contractual duty the St. George Lions Club had 
under the written application to indemnify AQHA for AQHArs 
negligence. 
The discovery record established that the International 
Association is completely separate from the St. George Lions 
Club, and nobody from the International Association had any role 
in the Chavez accident. Further, nobody from the International 
Association had anything to do with the written application 
signed by the St. George Club. Finally, the wording of the 
application was insufficient to establish contractual indemnity. 
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On this basis, Judge Eves granted summary judgment to the Inter-
national Association dismissing it from AQHA's third party 
complaint. 
Since the summary judgment in favor of the International 
Association disposed of all claims against it, the trial court 
entered final judgment under Rule 54(b), U.R.C.P. AQHA subse-
quently filed this appeal. On January 4, 1994, the Court of 
Appeals ruled that the case was properly certified under Rule 
54(b) and that this appeal is properly before the Court of 
Appeals as an appeal from a final judgment. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The International Association requests this Court to affirm 
summary judgment in its favor, dismissing the indemnity claim in 
AQHA's third-party complaint. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. This action arises from an accident which occurred on 
April 21, 1989, when Peter Chavez was injured while riding in a 
horse race conducted at the Dixie Downs Race Meet in St. George, 
Utah. (Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint, R. 352-357). 
2. Plaintiffs' first amended complaint is directed against 
defendants AQHA; Washington County, Utah; and the St. George 
Association of Lions Clubs. Plaintiffs' original complaint made 
claims against the International Association. However, those 
claims were dismissed by plaintiffs and the International 
Association does not appear as a defendant in plaintiffs' first 
amended complaint. (R. 259-261; 353-357). 
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3. In its answer to plaintiffs' first amended complaint, 
AQHA filed a third-party complaint against the International 
Association. The third-party complaint does not assert that the 
International Association itself was guilty of any wrongdoing, 
but simply asserts that the St. George Lions Club is a subsidiary 
of the International Association and thus the International 
Association is vicariously or derivatively liable for any 
contractual duty on the part of the St. George Lions Club to 
indemnify AQHA under the written Application for Recognition of 
Grading Races made by the St. George Lions Club on July 13, 1988. 
The one-page application provides in part: 
Applicant does hereby agree to indemnity, 
save and hold harmless the American Quarter 
Horse Association from any liability arising 
from unsafe conditions of track facilities 
or grandstand, default in payment of stakes 
or purses, or publication or dissemination 
by Association of information concerning any 
disciplinary rulings of Applicant's 
stewards. 
(AQHA's Third-Party Complaint, R. 493-505. The Application of 
Recognition of Grading Races is attached to this brief as Exhibit 
A. ) . 
4. Discovery depositions were taken by Mark C. Lukas, 
Executive Administrator of the International Association at his 
offices in Illinois; Ron McArthur, Secretary-Treasurer of the 
St. George Lions Club; and Joseph H. Bowcutt, Track Manager for 
the St. George Lions Club. The discovery record established that 
the International Association at no time agreed to be bound to 
the terms of the Application for Recognition of Grading Races. 
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The International Association did not receive, review, or have 
any information about this contract. The International 
Association has never had any communications with the St. George 
Lions Club or the AQHA wherein it agreed to be bound by the 
indemnification provisions of the contract. Nor did the 
International Association ever give the St. George Lions Club 
authority to represent it and bind it to the terms of the 
contract. At no time subseguent to the contract's execution did 
the International Association ratify the terms of the contract or 
agree to be in any way bound to it. (Mark Lukas Depo. at pp. 37-
40, R. 1340 et seg.; Ronald McArthur Depo. at pp. 72, R. 1526 et 
seg.; Joseph Bowcutt Depo. at p. 77, R. 1245 et seg.). 
5. The International Association has never asked the St. 
George Lions Club to act on the International Association's 
behalf or represent it in any matter. (Mark Lukas Depo. at p. 
27, R. 1340 et seg.). 
6. The International Association is a nonprofit 
organization based in Oakbrook, Illinois. (Mark Lukas Depo. at 
p. 8, R. 1340 et seg.). 
7. Mark C. Lukas, executive administrator of the 
International Association, is familiar with its business affairs, 
and how the International Association relates with local Lions 
Clubs throughout the United States and elsewhere. (Mark Lukas 
Depo. at pp. 6-7, R. 1340 et seg.). Ronald McArthur is the 
secretary/treasurer of the St. George Lions Club and has served 
as the club's liaison to the International Association for the 
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past 34 years. (Ronald McArthur Depo., pp. 49, 50, R. 152 6 et 
seq.). Joseph Bowcutt is a former president of the St. George 
Lions Club, was the club's track manager at Dixie Downs in 1988 
and 1989, and was the club member that signed the AQHA 
Application for Recognition of Grading Races. (Joseph Bowcutt 
Depo., pp. 13-15, 76, R. 1245 et seq.). 
8. The St. George Lions Club is not a corporation. (Mark 
Lukas Depo. at p. 40, R. 1340 et seq.). 
9. The International Association is a nonprofit 
organization which promotes service activities throughout the 
world through individual Lions Clubs. Each Lions Club, such as 
the St. George Club, is entirely autonomous in its operation. 
Each club recruits its own members, elects its own officers, 
chooses and carries out its own charitable activities, and raises 
its own funds. (Mark Lukas Depo. at pp. 7-10, R. 1340 et seq.; 
Ronald McArthur Depo., pp. 51-52, 76-77, R. 1526 et seq.). 
10. In an effort to promote charitable activities, the 
International Association provides publications to the local 
clubs which suggest charitable activities that other clubs have 
been successful in conducting. (Mark Lukas Depo. at p. 10, R. 
1340 et seq.). 
11. The International Association has no control over which 
charitable activities the local clubs choose to conduct, how they 
are conducted, or how the local clubs use the funds that they 
raise other than to request the funds be used for charitable 
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purposes. (Mark Lukas Depo. at pp. 11 and 24, R. 1340 et seq.; 
Ronald McArthur Depo., pp. 60-62, 69, R. 1526 et seq.). 
12. Lions Clubs have no financial obligation to the 
International Association other than each member has an $18.00 
annual membership fee. (Mark Lukas Depo. at p. 11, R. 1340 et 
seq.; Ronald McArthur Depo., pp. 52, R. 152 6 et seq.). 
13. There are 41,000 Lions Clubs worldwide that make up the 
International Association of Lions Clubs. (Mark Lukas Depo. at 
p. 11, R. 1340 et seq.). 
14. The essence of the International Association's contacts 
with the Lions Clubs, such as the St. George Lions Club, is as 
follows: 
Q. Why don't you briefly describe for us 
what activities International would be 
involved in Utah, vis. a vis., the 
local clubs? 
A. Well, the International works the same 
throughout the world, and that is that 
it is an organization of local clubs. 
We produce various materials that are 
made available to these clubs, once 
again to provide them with ideas for 
service activities. We provide model 
constitutions as to how they might 
operate, and we provide supplies that 
they can order. [Emphasis added] 
(Mark Lukas Depo. at pp. 15-16, R. 1340 et seq.). 
15. The International Association's communication with 
local clubs, such as the St. George Club, is minimal, limited to 
sending out the Lions' magazine to members of the clubs, 
communications on supplies ordered, and materials on suggested 
activities. Each club submits a monthly membership and 
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activities report which is primarily an informational report 
about each club. The report provides data on new members, 
dropped members, changes of address, and the amount of time spent 
on charitable activities. These reports are reviewed solely by 
data processing operators at the International Association to 
obtain statistical information. If an activity that was highly 
unusual appeared on the report, it may be referred to supervisory 
personnel. However, as long as the activity that the local club 
is involved in is not illegal or blatantly outside of the 
charitable mission of the Lions Clubs, then there is little the 
International Association can or would do about stopping the 
activity. (Mark Lukas Depo. at pp. 19-21, 77, 79, 144-145, R. 
1340 et seq.; Ronald McArthur Depo., pp. 48-49, 60-61, R. 1526 
et seq.). 
16. The International Association receives 40,000 
membership and activity reports every month. The report also 
goes to a "district governor" who is a locally elected Lions Club 
member who uses the report in an effort to encourage the local 
clubs in their service activities. (Mark Lukas Depo. at pp. 20, 
74, 75, R. 1340 et seq.). 
17. There are 700 district governors throughout the world, 
each serving a minimum of 35 local clubs. A district governor is 
a volunteer who receives no compensation other than reimbursement 
for travel expenses. (Mark Lukas Depo. at pp. 20, 139, R. 1340 
et seq.). 
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18. It would be a rare occasion for an official from the 
International Association to visit a local club such as the St. 
George Club. Typically, an International Association official 
will only go to a local club when he is invited to speak to a 
group of club members. (Mark Lukas Depo. at p. 21, R. 1340 et 
seq.). 
19. The members of the St. George Lions Club are members of 
that club only, and the St. George Club is a member of the 
International Association of Lions Clubs. The individual members 
of local clubs are not members of the International Association 
of Lions Clubs. (Mark Lukas Depo. at pp. 52-53, R. 1340 et seq.; 
Ronald McArthur Depo., pp. 46-47, R. 1526 et seq.). 
20. The International Association had no involvement in the 
planning, operation, or funding of any of the races that were 
conducted at the Dixie Downs Race Track. The St. George Lions 
Club did not request or need approval from the International 
Association to conduct the races. (Mark Lukas Depo. at pp. 29, 
30, 33, 35, R. 1340 et seq.; Ronald McArthur Depo., p. 69, R. 
1526 et seq.; Joseph Bowcutt Depo., pp. 78-80, R. 1245 et seq.). 
In addition to Ronald McArthur and Joseph Bowcutt, depositions 
were taken of Lions Club Members Donald Randall, Gerald Tischner, 
Bruce Jacobson, Gai Bowler, Dr. Larry 0. Staples, Jay Ence, and 
Kenneth Thompson. All of these club members indicated that there 
was no involvement by the International Association in the horse 
races at the Dixie Downs Race Track. Depositions were also taken 
of jockey Ralph Seville, jockey Joseph Meir, jockey Eddie Garcia, 
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jockey Roman Figureroa, horse trainer Donald Vickery, AQHA 
official Butch Jones, AQHA official Joe Langdon, and AQHA 
official Joe Wise, All of these individuals were present and 
involved in the April, 1989, races at the Dixie Downs Race Track, 
and none of them knew of any involvement that the International 
Association had in the conduct of these races. 
21. The International Association received no economic 
benefit from the races at the Dixie Downs Race Track. (Mark 
Lukas Depo. at p. 35, R. 1340 et seq.; Joseph Bowcutt Depo., p. 
80, R. 1295 et seq.). 
22. AQHA makes only one claim against the International 
Association. That claim is for indemnity for AQHA's own negli-
gence. AQHA's claim is as follows: 
3. The defendant, St. George Association 
of Lions Clubs (hereinafter "St. George 
Lions Club"), is a subsidiary of The 
International Lions Clubs, and is 
located in St. George, Utah. 
* * * 
6. At all times relevant herein, St. 
George Lions Club installed and 
maintained the track, rails, grounds, 
and equipment located at the Dixie 
Downs Race Track in St. George, Utah. 
St. George Lions Club is a subsidiary 
of the International Lions Club. 
•k Jc "k 
8. On or about July 13, 1988, St. George 
Lions Club submitted an Application for 
Recognition of Grading Races to the 
Racing Department of AQHA (hereinafter 
"Application") .... 
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9. Paragraph III of the Application 
contains the following agreement: 
"Tentative approval of this appli-
cation by AQHA does not establish 
said Association the insurer or 
guarantor of the safety or 
physical condition of Operator's 
facilities, stakes of any race, or 
reasonableness of steward's 
rulings; however, Applicant does 
hereby agree to indemnity, save 
and hold harmless the American 
Quarter Horse Association from any 
liability arising from unsafe 
conditions of track facilities or 
grandstand, default in payment or 
purses, or publication or 
dissemination by Association of 
the information concerning any 
disciplinary rulings of 
Applicant's stewards." 
10. Pursuant to Paragraph III of the Appli-
cation, St. George Lions Club, a 
subsidiary of International Lions 
Clubs, expressly agreed to indemnify, 
save, and hold harmless AQHA for any 
and all liability resulting from 
various circumstances, including 
"unsafe conditions of track facilities" 
11. In the event any liability is assessed 
against AQHA as a result of plaintiffs' 
claims in this action, AQHA is entitled 
to indemnity over and against Interna-
tional Lions Clubs and St. George Lions 
Club for said amounts, pursuant to the 
above-referenced agreement. [Emphasis 
in original] 
(AQHA's Answer and Third-Party Complaint, R. 493-505). 
The above-numbered facts were stated in the International 
Association's memorandum in support of summary judgment in the 
trial court and were not disputed by AQHA pursuant to Rule 4-
501(2), Code of Judicial Administration. The trial judge held a 
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hearing on June 14, 1993, and found on the record that the 
language of the application document is not specific enough to 
meet the requirements of Utah law. (R. 1695). Summary judgment 
was entered dismissing AQHA's claims for indemnity against the 
International Association, and this appeal followed. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
POINT I. The Application does not contain a clear and 
unequivocal agreement to indemnify AQHA for its own negligence as 
required by Utah case law. Even assuming the agreement may be 
interpreted to bind the International Association which is not a 
party to it, nevertheless, the language of the agreement is not 
specific enough to meet the requirements of Utah law, as the 
trial court found. In particular, the agreement fails expressly 
to state that any party will indemnify AQHA for AQHA's 
negligence. 
POINT II. The St. George Lions Club, which signed the 
agreement in question, was not the agent or subsidiary of the 
International Association and thus the St. George Club's 
contractual obligations are not imputable to the International 
Association. The requisite degree or extent of control is 
entirely absent from the relationship between the International 
Association and the St. George Lions Club. No relationship of 
agency or subsidiary may be inferred from the material facts. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE INDEMNITY LANGUAGE IN THE AGREEMENT IS NOT VALID 
UNDER UTAH LAW TO CREATE A DUTY TO INDEMNIFY FOR THE 
NEGLIGENCE OF THE PROMISEE. 
AQHA's claim is that the indemnity agreement requires the 
International Association to indemnify AQHA for " . . . any and 
all liability ..." arising from horse racing at Dixie Downs 
race track. (AQHA's Third-Party Complaint at para. 8, R. 493 et 
seq.). Of course, under Utah law, AQHA is responsible to 
plaintiffs only for its own proportion of fault. AQHA does not 
have a right of "contribution" from any other entity. Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-27-40. AQHA's claim is that the International 
Association must indemnify it for its own negligence. 
Utah law does not favor agreements wherein one party is to 
indemnify another party for the other party's own negligence. 
Howe Rents Corp. v. Worthen, 420 P.2d 848, 849 (Utah 1966); Union 
Pacific R.R. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 408 P.2d 910, 913-914 
(Utah 1965). Such indemnity contracts are strictly construed 
against the party seeking indemnity. Union Pacific R.R. v. 
International Farmers Ass'n, 568 P.2d 724, 725 (Utah 1911); 
Walker Bank & Trust Co. v. First Security Corp. , 341 P.2d 944, 
947 (Utah 1959). 
In Utah, for an indemnity agreement to be valid, there must 
be proof that the indemnitor clearly and unequivocally agreed to 
indemnify the indemnitee for his own negligence. Freund v. Utah 
Power and Light Co., 793 P.2d 362, 370 (Utah 1990). 
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In Freund, the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
A party is contractually obligated to assume 
ultimate financial responsibility for the 
negligence of another only when the 
intention is "clearly and unequivocally 
expressed." Shell Oil Co. , 658 P. 2d at 
1189; El Paso Nat. Gas Co., 17 Utah 2d at 
259, 408 P.2d at 914. 
Id. at 370. 
In order to require one party to indemnify another party for 
the negligence of such other party resulting in injury or death, 
Utah law requires that all of the following conditions be met: 
1. A clear and unequivocal express agreement by the 
contracting party. 
2. To indemnify the promisee for the promisee's 
negligence. 
3. In causing injury to the victim. 
4. In the work identified in the agreement. 
Freund, 793 P.2d at 370-372. 
In the instant case, the first three of these four 
requirements are not met. 
To be "clear," "unequivocal" and "express," the indemnity 
language must say that the indemnitor will indemnify the indemni-
tee for his own negligence. Wollam v. Kennecott Corp., 663 
F.Supp. 268, 272 (D. Utah 1987). The Wollam opinion specifically 
stated: 
Here, paragraph 8 of the insulation contract 
suffers from the same lack of specificity 
found deficient in El Paso. The general 
language that Stockmar releases Kennecott 
from claims based upon "any and all . . . 
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injuries or death, occasioned by anything 
occurring in or about the execution and 
performance of this purchase order . . . " 
fails expressly to state that Stockmar will 
indemnify Kennecott for Kennecott' s 
negligence, [Emphasis added] 
Id. at 272. 
Under Wollam, the traditional strict construction rule 
requires the indemnity agreement to specifically state that the 
indemnitor agrees to indemnify the indemnitee for his own 
negligence. 
The case of Gordon v. CRS Consulting Engineers Inc., 820 
P. 2d 492 (Utah App. 1991), reiterated that the strict 
construction rule was followed when it stated: 
The Utah courts apply the rule of strict 
construction when confronted with an 
indemnity agreement . . . Under this rule, 
there is a presumption against an intent to 
indemnify unless the intention is clearly 
and unequivocally expressed. [Emphasis 
added] 
Id. at 494. See also, Ericksen v. Salt Lake City Corp., 858 P.2d 
995, 998 (Utah 1993) . 
The indemnity provision of the Application for Recognition 
of Grading Races is too vague to be valid even again the St. 
George Lions Club because it does not delineate that the St. 
George Lions Club agrees to be responsible for AQHA's negligence. 
AQHA complains on appeal that the trial court failed to 
provide a statement of the grounds for its summary judgment 
decision under Rule 52(a), U.R.C.P. However, the trial court 
stated its grounds on the record with sufficient clarity. (R. 
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1695-96). Rule 52(a) provides that it will be sufficient if the 
Court's findings are stated orally and recorded in open court. 
In any event, AQHA overlooks the rule that the appeals court may 
affirm a grant of summary judgment on any ground available to the 
trial court, even if it is one not relied on by the trial court. 
For example, in Higgins v. Salt Lake Co., 855 P.2d 231, 233, 240-
241 (Utah 1993), the trial judge granted summary judgment to 
defendants on the ground that they owed no duty of care; the Utah 
Supreme Court concluded that the trial court erred in basing its 
summary judgment on lack of duty, but went on to address a 
question not reached by the trial court, whether there was 
immunity under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, and affirmed 
the judgment of the trial court on that alternative ground. 
Likewise, in State Farm Fire and Cas. Co. v. Gearyf 231 U.A.R. 12 
(Utah App. 1994), summary judgment was affirmed. See also Hill 
v. Seattle First National Bank, 827 P.2d 241, 246 (Utah 1992); 
Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Assoc, 752 P.2d 892, 895 (Utah 1988); 
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970). 
AQHA cites Dover Elevator Co. v. Hill Mangum Investments, 
766 P.2d 424 (Utah App. 1988), for the rule that failure by the 
trial court to state the grounds for its decision may be 
reversible error. Actually, that case states exactly the 
opposite with respect to summary judgments: "Findings and 
conclusions are ordinarily not required where a case is resolved 
on motion." 766 P. 2d at 426 n. 4. Further, the court's opinion 
in the Dover Elevator case was rendered on the facts and not 
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because of any procedural noncompliance with Rule 52(a). AQHA 
cites Masters v. Worsleyr 777 P.2d 499, 501 (Utah App. 1989), 
also for the rule that failure to comply with Rule 52(a) may 
justify remand to the trial court. However, in that case also, 
the Court of Appeals did not decide the appeal on the basis of 
any failure to state the grounds for the order. The Court of 
Appeals considered the theories propounded by respondent Worsley 
and found they insufficient and reversed on that ground. 
POINT II. 
THE UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS DO NOT SHOW ANY LEGAL 
GROUND FOR HOLDING THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION 
VICARIOUSLY LIABLE FOR THE ST. GEORGE LIONS CLUB'S 
CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS. 
AQHA makes no claim against the International Association of 
actual wrongdoing that caused the AQHA damages. Instead, AQHA 
claims that the International Association is vicariously or 
derivatively liable for any contractual duty that the St. George 
Lions Club owes AQHA as a result of the indemnity agreement. 
Therefore, if the International Association is not contractually 
bound to the indemnity agreement, or if the indemnity agreement 
is invalid against the International Association, then as a 
matter of law, AQHA has no claim against the International 
Association. 
The July 13, 1988, Application for Recognition of Grading 
Races, in which the indemnity agreement is contained, was signed 
by Joe Bowcutt as the "track manager." Above his signature, 
Bowcutt wrote "The St. George Lions Club." In his deposition, 
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Mr. Bowcutt acknowledged that he signed the Application for 
Recognition of Grading Races. As to the International 
Association's knowledge about the application, Mr. Bowcutt 
testified: 
Q. Did you ever have any communication 
with The International concerning this 
application? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. To your knowledge did any St. George 
Lion have any communication with The 
International concerning this applica-
tion? 
A. Not to my knowledge. 
Q. Did you ever receive any communication 
from The International with respect to 
this application? 
A. I did not. 
Q. In any of your dealings with the AQHA 
in connection with this application, 
did you ever make any statement or 
communication to AQHA that you were 
acting on behalf of The International? 
A. No, sir. 
•k k -k 
Q. Well, let me ask it this way: When you 
signed it, [the AQHA application] was 
it your intention that you were signing 
it on behalf of the St. George Lions 
Club? 
A. That's the way I signed it. 
•k "k k 
Q. Was it your intention to sign it on 
behalf of The International Association 
of Lions Clubs? 
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A. No. 
(Joe Bowcutt Depo. at pp. 76, 77, 86, 87, R. 1245 et seq.). 
The executive administrator of the International 
Association, Mark C. Lukas, made clear in his deposition that the 
International Association did not agree to be bound to the terms 
of the AQHA application. The International Association did not 
receive, review, or know of the application's existence prior to 
its execution, and did not subsequently find out about the 
application until the lawsuit was filed. The International 
Association did not give the St. George Lions Club authority to 
represent it or bind it to the terms of the AQHA application. 
(Mark Lukas Depo. at pp. 38-40, R. 1340 et seq.). 
There is no reference to the International Association in 
the AQHA application. 
Clearly, the International Association cannot be bound to 
the indemnity provision of the application when it had no 
knowledge of it. The AQHA claims the liability arises from the 
St. George Club being the International Association's 
"subsidiary." Mark Lukas, and the St. George Lions Club members 
who were deposed, stated that no "subsidiary" or "agent" 
relationship existed. However, even if it is assumed that the 
St. George Lions Club was a "subsidiary" of the International 
Association, a "subsidiary" cannot bind a "parent" to a contract 
without authority to do so. A "subsidiary" is equivalent to an 
"agent." The Restatement (Second) of Agency, § 7 states: 
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Authority is the power of the agent to 
effect the legal relations of the principal 
by acts done in accordance with the 
principal's manifestations of consent to 
him. [Emphasis added] 
Comment (a) to the above Restatement states in relevant part: 
"Authority" as used in the Restatement of 
this Subject, is the power of the agent to 
do an act or to conduct a transaction on 
account of the principal which, with respect 
to the principal, he is privileged to do 
because of the principal's manifestations to 
him. There is no authority unless there is 
power to effect the legal relations of the 
principal. . . . the privilege must come 
from the manifestations of consent of the 
principal that the agent should act upon 
account of the principal. [Emphasis added] 
The Restatement (Second) of Agency, § 26 reads in relevant 
part: 
. . . authority to do an act can be created 
by written or spoken words or other conduct 
of the principal which, reasonably inter-
preted, causes the agent to believe that the 
principal desires him to act on the 
principal's account. [Emphasis added] 
The case of Municipal Building Authority of Iron County v. 
Lowder, 711 P.2d 273 (Utah 1985), confirms that in Utah, a party 
cannot be bound by another to an agreement without a showing of 
consent to be bound. In this case, Iron County officials claimed 
the Iron County Board of Commissioners had created the Iron 
County Building Authority for the sole purpose of incurring debt 
to finance the new jail facility without having to go directly to 
the public for approval. Such an action was claimed to be 
unconstitutional because any debts incurred by the building 
authority were also the county's debts if the building authority 
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was an agent of the county. In affirming the trial court's 
rejection of this argument, the Utah Supreme Court pointed out 
that the building authority was not an agent because it did not 
have authority to bind the county to the debts. The court said: 
An agent cannot make its principal responsi-
ble for the agent's debts unless the agent 
is acting pursuant to either actual or 
apparent authority. See Restatement 
(Second) Agency, §§ 26 and 27 (1958). The 
latter is implied where the principal has 
permitted the agent to mislead third parties 
to extending credit to the agent in reliance 
on the principal's credit or has otherwise 
ratified the agent's action. Id. at § 27. 
We find neither condition for an agency 
relationship to be present in this case. 
There is no suggestion that the Authority is 
actually authorized to bind the county on 
the bonds
 f nor is there any basis for 
finding that third parties will be mislead 
as to the county's liability on the bonds. 
[Emphasis added] 
Id. at 279. 
Just as Iron County was found not be bound by the actions of 
the building authority, the International Association is not 
bound by the indemnity agreement that the St. George Lions Club 
entered into with AQHA. There is no evidence in this case that 
the International Association knew about the indemnity agreement, 
gave the St. George Lions Club authority to bind it to the 
agreement, or that the St. George Lions Club in any way led AQHA 
to believe that it had authority to bind the International 
Association to the indemnity agreement. 
The International Association is not vicariously liable for 
the St. George Lions Club's contractual obligations. Under any 
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theory of vicarious liability, the key issue is whether the 
International Association controlled the activities of the St. 
George Lions Club. The discovery record showed that the St. 
George Lions Club was an autonomous organization which was not 
under the control of the International Association. 
Restatement (Second) of Agency, § 1 defines the theory of 
agency as follows: 
(1) Agency is the fiduciary relationship 
which results from the manifestation of 
consent by one person to another that 
the other shall act on his behalf and 
subject to his control. . . . 
(2) The one for whom action is to be taken 
is the principal. 
(3) The one who is to act is the agent. 
[Emphasis added] 
There is no evidence that in this case the International 
Association asked the St. George Lions Club to act on its behalf 
and subject to its control. (Mark Lukas Depo. at p. 27, R. 1340 
et seq.). 
In Utah, the issue of "control" in an agency relationship 
was discussed in the case of Foster v. Steed, 432 P.2d 60 (Utah 
1967). In that case, a customer sued the operator of a service 
station and the oil company, Texaco, for burns received while 
helping the operator of the service station. The plaintiff 
contended that an agency relationship existed between Texaco and 
the local service station operator making Texaco liable for the 
acts of its agent. The trial court denied a motion by Texaco for 
summary judgment and Texaco brought an interlocutory appeal. The 
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Utah Supreme Court reversed the trial court's decision. The 
Supreme Court found that the local service station was not an 
agent of Texaco despite the fact that: (1) Texaco owned the 
service station facility; (2) Texaco insured that the service 
station was properly maintained; (3) Texaco inspected the 
facility; (4) the uniforms, gas pumps, documents, and the sign 
out front, all bore the Texaco logo; (5) the station 
traditionally only sold Texaco products; and (6) the manner of 
delivery of the products was controlled by Texaco. Instead, the 
court focused on the fact that: 
The operators were obligated to pay for 
their gas and accessories on a cash basis 
and could sell them at a price of their own 
determination. They could buy products from 
sources other than Texaco, and stood to 
retain all the profits and suffer all the 
losses incurred in the operation of the 
station. They could sell the products on a 
credit basis if they so desired. As 
previously mentioned, the operators could 
hire and fire their employees, set their 
hours of operation, and were not required to 
make reports to Texaco. . . . None of the 
evidence cited by plaintiff indicates that 
Texaco retained control of the day-to-day 
operation but, rather, merely influenced the 
result to be achieved, revealing an indepen-
dent contractor status. [Emphasis added] 
Id. at 63. 
Cases outside Utah use the same rationale as Foster in 
finding that national charitable organizations are not 
vicariously liable for the actions of their local units when the 
national organization did not control the day-to-day operations 
of the local organization. 
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In Himes v. Particular Council of Pima County, et a h , 728 
P. 2d 693 (Ariz. App. 1986), the plaintiff sued the Diocese of 
Tucson, and its affiliated charitable organizations, for having 
been molested by a volunteer of the charitable organizations 
while the volunteer was delivering food to the plaintiff. The 
volunteer was working directly for St. Vincent DePaul Society 
(SVDP) Conference. SVDP was organized by the Particular Council 
of Pima County (PCPC) who apparently answered directly to the 
Diocese of Tucson. PCPC was granted summary judgment because 
there was no issue of material fact that the volunteer was an 
agent of PCPC. The trial court's ruling was affirmed by the 
Arizona Court of Appeals. In its opinion, the Appellate Court 
quoted from the PCPC manual which stated: 
"Each parish conference is autonomous. 
Generally speaking each can operate in its 
own way, at its own pace, providing it works 
within the framework and 'Rule' of the 
international organization .... The 'Rule' 
provides for supervision of conferences to 
insure that this freedom is not abused and 
that they firmly adhere to the established 
framework of the Society." 
The orientation manual goes on to state: 
"The purpose of this council is to give 
unity and strength, coordination and 
supervision, direction and assistance to its 
several conferences and to serve as liaison 
between the conferences and higher levels of 
the society" 
Id. at 694. 
In analyzing the effect of PCPC's rules in relationship to 
its underlying charitable organizations, the court stated: 
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Focusing on the word 'supervision' in the 
passages above, the appellant claims that 
PCPC had the right to control Orozco's [the 
volunteer's] activities and that, therefore, 
he was its agent for whose activities it was 
liable. We do not believe the word 
'supervision' as used can be read as giving 
PCPC control over the activities of 
volunteer workers of SVDP conferences. In 
context, the supervision is limited to 
assuring that the conferences perform the 
charitable works that are the purpose of the 
Society. Who shall be members, what 
charitable works shall be undertaken, who 
shall be beneficiaries of those works, and 
the means by which these purposes shall be 
achieved are all committed to the local 
conference. There is no accountability by 
the conference to the council for its 'day-
to-day ' operation. . . . There was for the 
council 'no right to control the transaction 
in guestion' . . . The supervision that the 
council was authorized to provide was 
'spiritual supervision'; there is no 
evidence of any activity to control the 
operations of the conferences.... The 
control available to the council was control 
over the general ends to be pursued, not the 
means to achieve them. Such control does 
not make an owner liable for the acts of an 
independent contractor. . . . Neither does 
it make PCPC liable for the torts of a 
volunteer worker. . . . [Emphasis added] 
Id. at 694-695. 
In Davis v. Shelton, 304 N.Y.2d 722, appeal dism'd. 26 
N.Y.2d 829, 309 N.Y.2d, 358, 257 N.E.2d 902 (N.Y. 1969), a 
fourteen-year-old boy scout was seriously injured when the limb 
of the tree he was climbing broke under his weight and he fell to 
the ground. The boy was a member of Boy Scout Troop 39 which was 
at the time on an all-night camping trip. The trip was sponsored 
by the St. Andrew's Church and was also under a "charter" granted 
by the National Council of Boy Scouts of America, Inc. Prior to 
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being chartered by the Boy Scouts of America, the troop had to be 
pre-approved by the Susquenango Council of Boy Scouts of America. 
The plaintiff sued the Susquenango Council, St. Andrew's Church, 
the Scoutmaster, Assistant Scoutmaster, and the property owners 
on whose land the all-night camping trip was held. The New York 
Supreme Court granted summary judgment as to all the defendants 
except the Scoutmaster and Assistant Scoutmaster and the 
plaintiff appealed. The trial court's ruling was affirmed on 
appeal. The New York Appellate Court pointed out that the 
plaintiff alleged that both the church and the Boy Scout Council 
were negligent in providing incompetent and inexperienced leaders 
for the troop. In rejecting this argument, the court stated: 
Respondents' motions for summary judgment 
were properly granted since there was no 
triable issue of fact as to their 
negligence. There was no relationship which 
would make the Council and St. Andrew's 
Church liable for the acts of the defendants 
Shelton and Guinane. The Council is 
primarily a conduit which forwards troop 
charter applications to the National 
Council. It exercises no supervision or 
control over the activities of a scout troop 
which would be a primary element in 
establishing a master-servant relationship 
upon which to build a theory of respondeat 
superior. [Emphasis added] 
Id. at pp. 723-724. 
As was the case in Foster, Himes., and Davis., in this case 
there is no evidence that the International Association 
controlled the day-to-day operations of the St. George Lions 
Club, and thus the International Association cannot be liable for 
the indemnity agreement that the Club entered into with AQHA. 
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As to the St. George Club's finances, the St. George Club's 
secretary/treasurer, Ronald McArthur stated: 
Q. Did The International give any direc-
tions, instruction or control about how 
the St. George Club spent any money 
aside from the requirement of dues? 
A. No, sir. 
•k ic "k 
Q. Who is authorized to sign on that 
account [the St. George Club's bank 
account]? 
A. Three signatures. Four signatures. 
It's on the card. Mine has to be 
signed; three others are countersigned 
depending on the issuance of the check. 
We have — 
Q. Who are those three others? 
A. Chairman of the Race Committee, 
Chairman of the Rodeo Committee, and 
the President of the Lions Club is on 
the card. 
Q. St. George Club? 
A. St. George. 
Q. All these people are members of the St. 
George Club? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Is any person from The International on 
the bank account — 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Or empowered to handle the finances? 
A. No, sir. 
(Ronald McArthur Depo. at pp. 74 and 76, R. 1526 et seq.). 
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The St. George Lions Club determined what activities it 
would be involved in, funded those activities, and managed the 
activities. On this point, the vice president of the St. George 
Lions Club stated: 
Q. Has The International financed the 
Dixie Downs Project or the other races 
or any other activity of the St. George 
Club? 
A. No, sir. 
* * "k 
Q. Have you ever had any directions from 
The International about what activities 
you should spend your time on? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Has The International ever told the St. 
George Club, to your knowledge, that it 
should or should not participate in the 
Dixie Downs Project? 
A. No, sir. . . . 
Q. To your knowledge, does The 
International suggest or require a 
particular level of volunteer activity 
in terms of hours spent per month? 
A. No, sir. Depending on — sometimes 
they have — they have a district 
contest and give so many points for man 
hours. That's the only reason itfs put 
in. 
Q. Have you ever had any criticism from 
The International about the conduct of 
any of your activities? 
A* No, sir. 
Q. Have you ever received any guidelines 
from The International about what 
activities you should or should not 
participate in? 
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A. No, sir. 
(Ronald McArthur Depo. at pp. 60-62 and 76, R. 1526 et seq.). 
The International Association played no part in organizing, 
promoting, or conducting any of the horse races at Dixie Downs 
Race Track, specifically the race in question on April 21, 1989. 
On this issue, the Dixie Downs Track manager for the St. George 
Lions Club, Joseph Bowcutt, stated: 
Q. To your knowledge, has anyone at the 
St. George Club, including yourself, 
ever received any communications from 
The International concerning the 
standards for maintaining the track? 
A. Not to my knowledge. 
Q. Concerning the operation of races? 
A. Not to my knowledge. 
Q. Concerning the construction of track or 
the rails? 
A. Not to my knowledge. 
Q. Concerning the location of objects 
close to the inside railing? 
A. Not to my knowledge. 
Q. Concerning the requirements for jockey 
equipment? 
A. Not to my knowledge. . . . 
Q. Yes, do you have any knowledge of facts 
that the St. George Club ever went to 
The International for prior approval 
for their races? 
A. To my knowledge, no, they did not. 
Q. To your knowledge, did the St. George 
Lions Club ever give prior notice to 
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The International that it was going to 
conduct these particular races? 
A. Not to my knowledge. 
Q. To your knowledge, did The 
International ever inspect the race 
track or the conduct of the races by 
the St. George Club? 
A. Not to my knowledge. 
Q. To your knowledge, did The 
International ever benefit financially 
by — from the profits or revenues 
directly received by the St. George 
Club from the operation of the races? 
A. Not to my knowledge. 
(Joseph Bowcutt Depo. at pp. 78-80, R. 1245 et seq.). 
The St. George Lions Club had total autonomy as to who the 
members and officers of the club would be. (Mark Lukas Depo., 
pp. 7-10, R. 1340 et seq.; Ronald McArthur Depo., pp. 76-77, R. 
1526 et seq.; Joseph Bowcutt Depo., p. 79, R. 1245 et seq.). 
The St. George Lions Club did provide a monthly report to 
the International Association. However, both the International 
Association and the officers of the St. George Lions Club have 
made clear that these monthly reports were used for statistical 
purposes and not as a means of controlling the activities of the 
St. George Lions Club. (Mark Lukas Depo., pp. 20, 21, 77, 79, 
144-145, R. 1340 et seq.; Ronald McArthur Depo., pp. 60-61, R. 
1526 et seq.). 
The International Association had no more control over the 
St. George Lions Club than Texaco, The Particular Council of Pima 
County, or The Susquenango Counsel of Boy Scouts of America had 
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over their local units. The International Association did not 
finance the club's activities; had no control over how club funds 
were spent, did not determine or conduct club activities; did not 
choose or approve club officers or members; gave no prior 
approval to the club on any matter; had no ownership interest in 
any club facilities or assets; made no inspections, and; had no 
participation in the horse races at Dixie Down race track. 
Essentially, the International Association had nothing to do with 
the day-to-day operations of the St. George Club. At best, the 
International Association's relationship with the St. George Club 
was like that of the Particular Council of Pima County in Himes; 
it gave direction and assistance to the St. George Club, as it 
did with the 41,000 other clubs, to help it perform the 
charitable works that are the purpose of the local Lions Clubs. 
The relationship was intended to influence these charitable ends. 
The International Association in no way controlled the actions of 
the St. George Club in a way that would make the St. George Club 
its agent. 
The St. George Lions Club is not a "subsidiary" of the 
International Association. As mentioned, AQHA's third party 
complaint specifically refers to the St. George Lions Club as a 
"subsidiary" of the International Association. (R. 493-505). 
There is no evidence that the St. George Lions Club is a 
"subsidiary" of the International Association. A "subsidiary" is 
defined as "...a company wholly controlled by another." 
(Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary, at page 1176 [1986]). 
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The St* George Lions Club is clearly not a "company" controlled 
by the International Association. The St. George Lions Club is 
not a corporation, and the International Association has no 
ownership interest in any assets of the St. George Lions Club. 
(Mark Lukas Depo. at p. 40, R. 1340 et seq.; Ronald McArthur 
Depo. at p. 70, R. 1526 et seq.). Even if being a corporate 
entity is not a requirement to being a "subsidiary", there is 
clearly insufficient control between the International 
Association and the St. George Lions Club for a "subsidiary" 
relationship to exist. The degree of control necessary is 
pointed out in Japan Petroleum Company v. Ashland Oil, Inc., et 
al. , 456 F.Supp. 831 (U.S. D. Ct. Del. 1978) when the United 
States Court for the District of Delaware quoted Consolidated 
Rock Co. v. DuBois, 312 U.S. 510 (1941) and stated: 
It is well settled that where a holding 
company directly intervenes in the 
management of its subsidiaries so as to 
treat them as mere departments of its own 
enterprise, it is responsible for the 
obligations of these subsidiaries incurred 
or arising during its management. 
Id. at 838. 
The court went on to define the degree of control necessary 
when it stated: 
In order to determine whether or not a 
sufficient degree of control exists to 
establish an agency relationship, the court 
must look to a wide variety of factors, such 
as stock ownership, officers and directors, 
financing, responsibility for day-to-day 
operations, arrangements for payment of 
salaries and expenses, and origin of the 
subsidiary's business and assets . . . all 
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of these factors may be considered in 
determining whether the combination of 
circumstances indicates such a relationship. 
Id. at 841. 
It was further pointed out in Japan Petroleum that the 
central issue in determining a subsidiary relationship is the 
element of control, i.e. whether the parent corporation 
"dominated" the activities of the entity claimed to be the 
subsidiary. Id. at 840-841. 
There is no evidence in this case that the International 
Association "dominated" the activities of the St. George Lions 
Club. Taking the elements of control itemized in Japan 
Petroleumf the International Association had no ownership 
interest in the St. George Club, did not determine or direct the 
officers or membership of the club, had no responsibility for the 
day-to-day operations of the club, gave no money to the club to 
fund salaries or activities, and had no participation in the 
determination or operation of fund raising activities. As a 
result, the St. George Lions Club cannot be classified as 
"subsidiary" of the International Association, and the 
International Association is not liable for the local club's 
actions. 
The International Association cannot be vicariously liable 
for the St. George Lions Club's Actions Simply Because the St. 
George Club is a member of the International Association of Lions 
Clubs. AQHA argued to the trial court that a member of the St. 
George Lions Club is also a member of the International 
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Association of Lions Clubs and thus the International Association 
is vicariously liable for the St. George Lions Club members' 
agreement to indemnify the AQHA. Mark Lukas clarified in his 
deposition that the members of the St, George Club are members of 
that club only, and it is the St. George Club itself that is a 
member of the International Association of Lions Clubs. (Mark 
Lukas Depo. at pp. 52-53, R. 1340 et seq. ) . In fact, the members 
of the St. George Lions Club each have a membership card that 
certifies that the individual is a member of the St. George Lions 
Club. The membership card does not indicate that the individual 
is a member of the International Association of Lions Clubs. The 
backside of the membership card indicates that the card serves as 
"Proof of your being a Lion in good standing in your Club." 
Even if St. George Lions Club members were also members of 
the International Association, that fact alone would not make the 
International Association liable for the actions of the club 
members. As shown in the above-mentioned cases, Himes v. 
Particular Council of Pima County, 728 P.2d 693, and Davis v. 
Shelton, 304 N.Y.2d 722, a charitable organization is not liable 
for the actions of one of its local volunteers unless a 
significant degree of control can be shown by the international 
organization over the local charitable unit out of which the 
volunteer worked. As discussed, no such control existed in this 
case. With 41,000 clubs, it is obvious that the International 
Association could not, and did not, control the local clubs, such 
as St. George, to the extent necessary to be vicariously liable 
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for the St. George Club's actions. Thus, if a St. George Club 
member negotiated and signed an agreement with AQHA, that 
agreement has no bearing on the International Association. 
CONCLUSION 
The terms of the application for recognition of grading 
races are not adeguate to create a duty to indemnity AQHA as the 
promisee for its own negligence. Such agreements are not favored 
in Utah law and are strictly construed against the party seeking 
indemnity. The language of the application in this case falls 
far short of the reguired specificity. Even if the indemnity 
language were sufficient, it would extend only to the St. George 
Lions Club, as the promissor in the agreement. The International 
Association was not a party to the agreement. The relationship 
between the International Association and the St. George Lions 
Club was not one which would render the International Association 
liable as a matter of law for agreements made by the St. George 
Lions Club. 
This Court should affirm the summary judgment. 
DATED this /J day of May, 1994. 
STRONG & HANNI 
BY Jffr 
Roger 
Peter H. Christensen 
Attorneys for International 
Association of Lions Clubs 
205661nh 
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EXHIBIT A 
AMERICAN QUARTER HORSE ASSOCL "N 
RACING DEPARTMENT 
APPLICATION FOR RECOGNITION OF GRADING RACES 
I. Track Operator ST. GEORGE LIONS CLUB 
(Name of Person!s) or 
organization; if organization, 
to as "Applicant", hereby app 
of the grading races at 
Which is located at 
Recognition is requested for c 
, name of "autfior i z ed representative) herein after referred 
lies for recognition by American Quarter Horse Association 
DIXIE DOWNS 
I Name of Irack) 
P.O. BOX 214 
(Mai ling Address) 
ST. GEORGE, UTAH 84770 
(City, State and Zip Code) 
jrading races to be held on the following dates: 
APRIL 21 & 22, 1989 
APRIL 28 & 29, 1989 
II. Applicant agrees to comply fully v/ith the terms and conditions of this application 
and the American Quarter Horse Association Regulations for Approved Grading Meets, 20th 
edition, or any future edition or amendment thereof (which publication is incorporated 
therein by reference and made a part hereof for all purposes) and Applicant's failure to 
so comply will be cause for refusal of recognition of any and all races, and will 
jeopardize any further approval of races conducted by Applicant. When the Association 
finds that all races have been conducted according to this agreement, and all other 
regulations of the Association, then, and only in such event, will such races be 
recognized and charted. 
III. Tentative approval of this application by AQUA does not establish said Association 
the insurer or guarantor of the safety or physical condition of Operator's facilities, 
stakes of any race, or reasonableness of stewards' rulings; however, Applicant does 
hereby agree to indemnity, save and hold harmless the American Quarter Horse Association 
from any liability arising from unsafe conditions of track facilities or grandstand, 
default in payment of stakes or purses, or publication or dissemination by Association of 
information concerning any disciplinary rulings of Applicant's stewards. 
This application is signed in duplicate on this the A3th day of j n \ v 
Signature Operator and/or (Jw:eFJ 
P.O. Box 214 
